According to a wrong interpretation of the Bell theorem, it has been repeatedly claimed in recent times that we are forced by experiments to drop any possible form of realism in the foundations of quantum mechanics. In this paper I defend the simple thesis according to which the above claim cannot be consistently supported: the Bell theorem does not concern realism, and realism per se cannot be refuted in itself by any quantum experiment. As a consequence, realism in quantum mechanics is not something that can be simply explained away once and for all on the basis of experiments, but rather something that must be conceptually characterized and discussed in terms of its foundational virtues and vices. To assess it, we cannot rely on experimentation but rather on philosophical discussion: realism is not a phlogiston-like notion, despite the efforts of the contemporary quantum orthodoxy to conceive it in Russellian terms as the relics of a bygone age.
Introduction
The Western philosophical thought has learnt since its very early days that the idea that there is a world out there -a world whose properties are (at least partially) independent from what we might think of them and even from our very attempts to have access to them -has a peculiar status. Although for some the idea of a world out there is too obviously right in order to waste time to argue in favour of it, whereas for others it is too obviously wrong in order to waste time to try to refute it, most philosophers would agree that a more or less sophisticated array of arguments is needed in order to make realism (or anti-realism, or any variant that lies in the continuum between these two poles) a plausible position. This long and honoured story, however, seems to be forgotten when considered from the standpoint of the foundations of contemporary physics. Surprisingly enough, the world-out-there-idea has recently acquired to the eyes of many physicists and philosophers of physics the status of a pathology, to be recognized as such and to be eradicated as soon as possible. In relatively recent times, some highly respected physicists try not only to convince us with qualitative arguments that the world-out-there-idea cannot easily live with our best theory of the microscopic phenomena (a plausible attempt, although controversial), but also to turn such a philosophical stance into an empirical hypothesis that can be put to test in advanced physical experiments performed in labs and refuted once and for all.
This experimentally flavoured anti-realism seems to be a recent development in the line of what Abner Shimony used to call experimental metaphysics, and the completion of such a project would amount to nothing less than -so the story goes -realizing that the Aristotelian theory of motion fails to correctly explain either the physics on the Earth or that of the Heavenly spheres:
So, what is the message of the quantum? I suggest we look at the situation from a new angle. We have learned in the history of physics that it is important not to make distinctions that have no basis -such as the pre-newtonian distinction between the laws on Earth and those that govern the motion of heavenly bodies. I suggest that in a similar way, the distinction between reality and our knowledge of reality, between reality and information, cannot be made. There is no way to refer to reality without using the information we have about it. Maybe this suggests that reality and information are two sides of the same coin, that they are in a deep sense indistinguishable. If that is true, then what can be said in a given situation must, in some way, define, or at least put serious limitations on what can exist. (Zeilinger 2005, p. 743) Attractive as it may seem, this project is far from being well-founded, since it rests essentially on an incorrect interpretation of the Bell theorem (and also of the original Bell's motivation for the theorem). In order to see why, it is useful to list the steps the strategy of the project goes through, starting from the EPR argument itself up to the final conclusions: the list will also provide a roadmap for the present paper.
NO-REALISM STRATEGY
1. The EPR argument shows that quantum mechanics either is incomplete or non-local.
2. Bell proposes to locally 'complete' quantum mechanics by the formulation of a hiddenvariable (i.e. 'realistic') local theory.
3. The Bell theorem proves that any local realistic theory is inconsistent with the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics. 5. A new class of theories (non-local realistic theories) is introduced, in which realism is preserved but locality is abandoned (Leggett 2003) . Within this class, a new inequality is derived and again shown to be inconsistent with quantum mechanics.
6. The violation of the Leggett inequality is experimentally confirmed.
The final outcome is that we should give up realism altogether, since no theory -be it local or nonlocal -can preserve it and at the same time be consistent with the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics.
In order to show that the project cannot work -and hence that the issue of realism cannot be decided once and for all on an experimental basis -I will adopt the following counter-strategy.
After presenting the background of the no-realism project in section 2, I will emphasize in section 3 that the focus of the original Bell proposal was not on hidden variable theories per se, but rather on a hypothetical local completion of quantum mechanics, whatever form such completion might assume: the Bell theorem -that is -should be interpreted as concerning not local realism, but simply locality. As a consequence, there is no choice to be done between locality and realism, and the violation of the Leggett inequality cannot do the job it is supposed to do, namely the ultimate refutation of realism in the quantum domain. In this perspective, the positive input that Bell himself received from the actual formulation of Bohm's theory should not be overlooked: when this is done, it should be clear why Bell could not be seriously interested to a local hidden variable theory in the sense of the anti-realism project. The sections 2 and 3 partially read more like a review, but a much-needed one: in more or less recent years several authors (Ghirardi, Grassi 1994 , Maudlin 1996 , Norsen 2007 , Laudisa 2008 , Ghirardi 2009 ) have shown in detail the extent of such misunderstanding, but these contributions do not seem to have even scratched the wall of faith that surrounds it. In the last section, on the other hand, I would like to suggest a more constructive move. Since on the basis of the arguments recalled in the first sections the idea of an observation-independent world is not -and cannot be -in itself incompatible with any known physical fact, there might be more interesting ways to deal with it. In this vein, I will refer to the possibility of applying the concept of en-theorizing (first introduced by Arthur Fine in the eighties) to the way in which possibly 'realistic' interpretations of quantum mechanics deal with the idea of an observation-independent world.
«Local realism» and its background
The whole enterprise of eradicating any visible trace of 'realism' from the quantum domain rests essentially on a specific interpretation of the Bell theorem: according to one of n similar statements spread all over the main journals in the areas of the foundations of physics and philosophy of science "John Bell showed that theories of local hidden variables, which don't permit any remote influences, cannot explain certain quantum-physical observations" (Weihs 5 quantum mechanics provides a more accurate description than do local hidden variable theories (p.
505, my emphasis).
The 'realistic' part of the local realism condition is often formulated, even recently, as the idea that physical systems are endowed with pre-existing properties that turn out to be independent of any measurement. Under the assumption of local realism, therefore, and provided quantum mechanics' predictions are taken for granted, a die-hard view takes the Bell theorem to be a result that does not establish non-locality but rather the impossibility of any objective (i.e. observerindependent in principle) account of the quantum phenomena 2 . According to the paper of 
The failure of 'local realism': a false dilemma
In the EPR setting with strict spin anticorrelation, the very existence of definite properties (call them 'hidden variables', 'pre-existent properties', 'objective properties', 'classical properties' or whatever you like) is a consequence of the locality assumption. Since in the EPR setting the distant spin outcomes turn out to be anticorrelated, if we require the theory to be local then it cannot be the case that the anticorrelation is explained by the measurement procedure on one side affecting the outcome at the other, far away side. Therefore, the only reasonable explanation of the distant spin outcomes being anticorrelated is that there are definite values for the spins already at the source: due to the logical structure of the argument, the only independent assumption is undoubtedly locality (Laudisa 2008 , pp. 1118-1123).
But also in the more general EPR setting with non-strict spin anticorrelation, the so-called stochastic hidden-variable theories' framework (originally introduced in Bell 1971 and Clauser, Horne 1974), no independent 'realism' assumption plays any role although, once again, conventional wisdom tries its best to include it in the set of the Bell theorem's conditions. In the stochastic hidden-variable theories' framework (we will refer to the BCH framework, since this was originally introduced in Bell 1971 and Clauser, Horne 1974), a typical EPR joint system S 1 +S 2 is prepared at a source, so that a 'completion' parameter λ is associated with the single and joint detection counts. Suppose we denote by a and b respectively the setting parameters concerning two detectors, located at space-like separation and devised to register the arrival of S 1 and S 2 respectively. The model then is assumed to satisfy the following conditions:
• BCH1. The parameter λ is distributed according to a function ρ(λ) that does not depend either on a or on b.
• BCH2. The parameter λ prescribes single and joint detection probability.
• BCH3. Locality holds, namely the λ-induced probability for the measurement outcomes for S 1 and S 2 separately is such that (i) the detection probability for S 1 depends only on λ and a,
(ii) the detection probability for S 2 depends only on λ and b, (iii) and the joint detection probability is simply the product of the detection probability for S 1 and the detection probability for S 2 .
What Bell is interested to in this context is a joint probability distribution P (A, B should such an assumption be adopted, it would be obviously sufficient for the existence of local factors, but it would such a strong requirement as to make virtually empty the class of 'serious' local theories that might be put to test in a stochastic framework. In other words, it is true that the assumption of pre-existing properties for the two systems at the source might well imply locality, but the assumption that only local operations and influences can contribute to fix the single detection probabilities does not require the assumption of pre-existing properties (Laudisa 2008 (Laudisa , pp. 1123 (Laudisa -1127 . Again, Bell himself was concerned to emphasize which were the real assumptions in the argument and how general the stochastic framework was intended to be: is meant to indicate that the value at A is ± 1 provided that the setting at A is m and the setting at B is n. This is equivalent to the assumption that a joint probability distribution
always exists.
Locality
The appearance of a given value on the display at Alice's (Bob's) station in no way depends on what happened at Bob's (Alice's) station. The expression 'what happened' includes both the selection of a given setting and the appearance of a specific value.
Free Will
The selection of a local setting at a given station (be it A or B) in no way depends on the source.
On the basis of these assumption, Brukner and Žukowski show that a CHSH-type inequality can be easily derived (Brukner and Žukowski 2010, eq. (23) ).
What does the point seem to be about realism, then? The point seems to be the assumption that realism is equivalent to the existence of the joint probability distribution
But one thing is to define what realism amounts to, and quite another one to assume that the definition is actually satisfied: I can well define what a winged horse is supposed to be, without being able to prove that such a thing exists in the world! As a matter of fact, in the above model the characterization of Realism as the existence of a suitable joint probability distribution does not imply by itself that such a distribution exists: it is exactly Locality that imposes on the form of the distribution the very constraint we need in order to be sure that the desired joint probability distribution actually exists. For let us assume that the theory is local. Then as marginals, since P(A n & B m ) = P(A m ) P(B n ), with n, m = 1,2. Also in this framework, that is, realism is justified by locality which turns out then to be the real culprit 4 .
Ways out of the (false) dilemma: possible prospects for a quantum realism?
What can we conclude from the above arguments then? Although the issue will presumably continue to be controversial, there are several morals to be drawn, some in the form of (provisional) conclusions others in the form of future projects. Asking questions like the following does not seem terribly promising as a way to meaningfully investigate about the plausibility of a realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics (whatever this interpretation might be): for this sort of question assumes implicitly that it is meaningful (to try) to answer without precisely defining the resources of the theoretical framework in which the question can be framed, as if the notion of realism 'as applied to the physical world' could live in a conceptual vacuum and still make sense.
A more fruitful route might profit from a proposal that Arthur Fine put forward several years ago to assess the very nature of the Einsteinian use of such notions as 'realism', 'causality' and 'determinism' (Fine 1986 ). Fine first quotes a letter of Einstein that reads as follows:
"On this account it can never be said with certainty whether the objective world is «causal». Instead one must ask whether a causal theory proves to be better than an acausal one." (Letter to H. Titze, January 16, 1954) After Fine comments:
The upshot is to move the entire issue of causality out of the empirical realm, where it would be conceived of as more or less separately and directly subject to empirical test. Instead, one gets at the issue of causality by specifying what counts as a causal theory (namely, one with nonprobabilistic laws), and one replaces questions about whether causality holds in nature by questions about which theory is better. (Fine 1986, p. 88) Fine coins the word "entheorizing" to denote the above move. If we apply this viewpoint to our question, the suggestion is to try to en-theorize realism, namely investigate how a realistic theory might perform with respect to a non-realistic one. If 'realism' (in the sense of the 'local realism' arguments) plays no role, a conflict between a(n even) non-local «realistic» theory and quantum mechanics might hardly tell against the viability of realism in quantum physics. On the other hand, and in the spirit of en-theorizing notions like realism (and possibly others), we might wonder what sort of general requirements should we ask a realistic quantum theory to satisfy (at this level, then, it matters little whether we call such a theory 'realistic', 'causal' or whatever you like). I list what I take to be plausible requirements:
1. Ontology: A realistic formulation should clearly and unambiguously posit at the outset a domain of entities which are supposed to be the basic objects of the theory (let us call them Tentities).
Observer-independence:
A realistic formulation should not need assume the necessity of observers for the basic properties of the T-entities to hold, though being able to recover observer-dependent notions and results.
